

Research Report

Evaluating Foreign Policy of Pakistan in the context of Strategic Coercion

by

Ahmed Awais Khaver, Muhammad Awais Umar, Dr Shafqat Munir Ahmad

Mega Lecture

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Mailing Address:

PO Box 2342, Islamabad, Pakistan

Telephone: 0092-51-2278134, 2278136, 2277146, 2270674-76

Fax: 0092-51-2278135,

URL: www.sdpi.org

Abstract

Diplomacy and war go side by side in deciding relations between countries. In normal diplomacy, countries enjoy bilateral agreements, concessions and mutual trust for the benefit of their peoples, but in a diplomacy characterized by coercion and tough conditions, a powerful country resorts to giving dictations such as 'do more' and sets demands, a timeline to fulfil the demand or otherwise face consequences on non-compliance. This study has analyzed how Pakistan has been subjected to coercive diplomacy. Since the coercion continues on the diplomatic front and media, there is a need to mobilize people of Pakistan on the dynamics of coercive diplomacy and grey hybrid war being unleashed against the country so that they can understand the war doctrine, methodologies and tactics of the enemies. We have to rethink whether or not our foreign, economic and domestic policies are aligned to realize the gravity of the situation. We as a nation need to look at the options to counter three big war doctrines perpetuated on Pakistan. We need to weigh our economy, to plug the loopholes in the system and to strengthen participatory democracy and people's centric governance so that we can win over our people by building their confidence in state and the system and providing them a decent living and justice and inculcate them the feeling of being equal citizens living in a peaceful and tolerant society. The people of Pakistan together with its military and political leadership can defeat all nefarious war doctrines against their country.

Keywords: Diplomacy, Coercion, War, Grey ybrid war, Democracy, Terrorists, Military, Doctrine, FATF, IMF, 5th generation war

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1. Introduction

Diplomacy and war go hand in hand in deciding relations between countries. When diplomacy embeds itself with strategic coercion and war, it goes unconventional in terms of using hybrid tactics; it creates doubt among strategic allies and hence 'hate and love' and 'carrot and stick' relations are developed while it worsens relations with enemies.

Pakistan, since its inception by and large, adopted a foreign policy on the principles of Non-alignment though it entered into an alliance with the United States in 1954 when both the countries signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and also joined SEATO the same year (Khan 1964). Pakistan's decision to join this alliance was the need of the hour at that time to counter the tyranny of power-disparity as mandated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, (Sattar¹ 2018). About the current strained relations between Islamabad and Washington, Sattar (2018) writes that the reason for dissolution of alliance with the United States is a fundamental change in strategic policies of both the countries as Pakistan is consolidating its alliance with the People's Republic of China and the United States, as punishment to Pakistan, is strengthening its relations with India to build a threat perception for Pakistan.

As a strategic option, the United States also encouraged Afghanistan to build and strengthen its relationship with India so that as a strategic coercion they can exert a three-pronged pressure by somehow bullying Pakistan from its two borders coupled with using hybrid war tactics, including digital and media warfare to sell the narrative blaming Pakistan for 'supporting terrorists' (ostensibly hinting towards so-called Haqqani Network). The United States, its NATO allies, including its non-allied partner India and fully allied partner Afghanistan, after failing to bring peace in the war-torn Afghanistan, wanted to shift blame for their failure onto Pakistan and to achieve this motives and is selling their narrative by using global media including digital media and coercion in its diplomatic overtures as part of its campaign against Pakistan.

The conflict in Afghanistan is categorized as a hybrid conflict in gray zone. In Afghanistan, several Taliban groups are fighting against the allied troops and the Afghan army in their bid to liberate their country from what they call the foreign occupants. Their fight is clearly against the military forces inside Afghanistan. However, the allied forces who have literally failed to counter the Afghan Taliban's attacks are shifting the blame onto Pakistan as if the conflict in gray zone (as the battlefield is not defined along boundaries and includes guerrilla war) in Afghanistan is being heightened by the elements somehow what they blame are backed by Pakistan.

The Taliban insurgency continued for years on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan on its part had been successful in eliminating the terrorist outfits and their hideouts inside Pakistani territory as a result of a couple of result-oriented military operations. But, unfortunately, the US

and allied forces could not achieve tangible successes in their areas of operations inside Afghanistan. The US and allies neither could provide a viable political and administrative system in Afghanistan nor they could do anything to win the hearts and minds of the people. In other words, they did not focus on development of Afghanistan and providing relief to the people. They, in a bid, to hide their failures are continuously blaming Pakistan for providing hidden support to Taliban groups fighting inside

¹ Abdul Sattar served in the foreign services of Pakistan for 39 years as ambassador, foreign secretary and foreign minister.

Afghanistan. Pakistan had offered to fence the border so that infiltration does not take place but Pakistan's this action has also not been liked by them.

Instead of realizing their faults and failure, the US leadership is asking Pakistan 'to do more' which is a term synonymous to diplomatic coercion. With the establishment of new government in Pakistan, the US high level delegations visited Pakistan and their recipes, for the normalization of relations have been tainted with and exhibited 'do more' demand and timelines for the fulfilment of their demands. This sort of attitude is a glare example of strategic and diplomatic coercion.

In normal diplomacy, countries enjoy bilateral agreements, concessions and mutual trust for the benefit of their peoples, but in a diplomacy characterized by coercion and tough conditions, the powerful country resorts to giving dictations such as 'do more' and sets demands, a timeline to fulfil the demand or otherwise face consequences on non-compliance. **The coercive diplomacy nulls diplomatic norms and takes on board 'enemy of enemy as friend'.** The United States, applying this coercive mode, took India on board to trigger its coercive mode against Pakistan knowing that New Delhi may play anti-Pakistan role to exert pressure.

Pushing a target country to back down through coercive diplomacy threatening for consequences, may or may not work as it depends upon the strengths of the target country. It is a power game, in fact. That is why, George and Simons (1994) warned against the use of coercive diplomacy. Quoting from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as a case study, they are of the opinion that though sometimes coercive diplomacy may achieve reasonable objectives in a crisis with less costs, fewer political and psychological costs as compared to the costs of military offensive. But, in their final analysis, coercive diplomacy has its own limitations depending upon the parties involved and the nature of the conflict.

In theoretical perspective, coercive diplomacy only works when the demand behind the initiative is somehow rational and a limitation approach, in line with George and Simons (1994)'s work, is applied. Analyzing the US coercive diplomacy with Pakistan, one applying the limitation approach and circumstances and the countering power of the target country would conclude that the US may not achieve its desired results through coercive approach as Pakistan stands strong militarily, economically and diplomatically with its ties with China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. The US has to come to the terms of negotiations by understanding Pakistan's narrative on the bone of contention- the situation in Afghanistan.

Similarly, Pakistan is facing literal wars on two of its long war prone borders with Afghanistan and India. **The Afghanistan-Pakistan war doctrine is pretty much linked to successes and failures of the U.S. and the allied forces in Afghanistan. This war is being used by the U.S. and allies to malign Pakistan in their global campaigns- digitally and through mainstream media and hence this war is linked to 4th and 5th generation wars.** Moreover, India is also spending huge sums on building its military might to continue with its 'cold start' war doctrine against Pakistan. New Delhi under its war strategies at one place is putting its military might along the borders while it is trying to diplomatically isolate Islamabad from rest of the world to cripple its economy and defence preparedness.

The other currently dangerous but physically invisible war, Pakistan is facing, is the 4th and 5th generation hybrid war in which the enemies of Pakistan through various means are trying to widen the gap between Pakistan's armed forces and the people of Pakistan. The enemies finance activities that weaken the social fabric of the society by pitching various communities against each other by fanning hatred on ethnical and religious grounds. Such campaigns lead to more regionalism by weakening the central writ. They fuel ethnic, faith based and sectarian violence and create feeling of disillusion and

panic among the people. Under hybrid 4th and 5th generation war, they finance mainstream and digital media to spread falsehood in a target country to promote anarchy, uncertainty and distrust. The US under this war doctrine has damaged Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya and extended the sphere of its hybrid war in conflict zones in Syria and Afghanistan largely and in Pakistan partially.

Unfortunately, the US in its hybrid war has been successful in achieving its objectives in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya. But it is facing failures in Afghanistan and Syria. Pakistan happened to be tough as compared to other countries where the US-led propaganda forces waged the hybrid wars. Pakistan is a nuclear power and a country where its communities are largely resilient. Pakistan has so far been resisting an unholy alliance of US, India and Israel that had reportedly spent millions of dollars a year in Pakistan's media. India directly or indirectly influenced Pakistani media.

The 5th generation hybrid war is being fought in grey zones/frontiers that are not physically defined as these zones are in the minds of the people and communities. The trio (US, India and Israel) is spending money on this war as it may back their coercive diplomacy, as on the one hand, they may demand 'do more' against terrorists and on the other through the grey hybrid war, they may influence people igniting them against their security apparatus. This war is so peculiar that the military cannot fight it with their machinery. The 5th generation war can be fought by the nation, particularly foreign policy experts, media, intellectuals, think tanks and people in general. This is only possible if they are able to understand the nature of the 5th generation hybrid war in grey zones - the minds and lives of the people beyond physical borders.

2. Strategic and diplomatic coercion in literature

Interaction as well as relationship among states either bilaterally or multilaterally is termed as diplomacy. Empires, kingdoms, city states and now nation states have and are employing tactics to engage with one another to achieve their respective interests and objectives. Since the end of the Cold War, the term coercive diplomacy has gained prominence in international relations for "crisis management" (Crystal 2015). Large- or full-scale wars have become obsolete in current times. They have been replaced with effective and pinpointed application of diplomatic and strategic pressure to extract favourable outcomes (ibid).

Coercive diplomacy has long been employed as a foreign policy tool in international relations. Strategic or diplomatic coercion means to influence, compel or force a state to either adopt or to do away with a certain course of action. The debate rages on efficacy of such initiatives. The application of such coercion includes economic sanctions to influence internal political scenario of a state and to compel the target state to act in accordance with stronger states' strategic or economic gains. Strategic coercion also hints at or involves the threat of use of force against a state to force it to respond accordingly (Perez 2015). Coercive diplomacy is a political tool which has the ability to resolve crises and avoid full scale war (Romeo 2016). Coercive diplomatic strategies are used by states when their objectives of interests are opposed by other states. This concept has gained prominence after the Second World War but essentially after the Cold War. The concept highlights the strategies and options of non-military instruments employed to achieve objectives of foreign policy to extract a certain type of behavior from "target states" (Smith 2012).

Modern methods and strategies of coercion vary from state-to-state and from target-to-target. More recent methods include trade embargoes, breaking of diplomatic relations, voting against target states' interests at international forums and expulsion from such international forums (Jentleson 2006). Second

set of such coercive diplomacy includes the use of economic sanctions, arms embargoes, travel bans and financial sanctions (Smith 2012).

Despite such harsh methods at the disposal of the stronger states, the success of such coercion is not guaranteed. George (1994), a prominent authority on the subject of international relations and especially coercive diplomacy suggests that the desired results from such coercion are hard to achieve. For such tactics to succeed, George mentions eight basic fundamentals of coercive diplomacy. The fundamentals say that the objective to be achieved through coercive diplomacy must be transparent; coerced state firmly accepts the demands. There exists a support on the domestic and international side for the coercer, coercing state must have strong authority, terms of settlement must be crystal clear, the coercer state must establish urgency of the demand, the target states must be apprised of the escalation of the matter; and imbalance in the coercer's motivations meaning that the target must not be resisting the objective fiercely (Markwica 2018).

Coercive diplomacy includes economic sanctions as a significant factor to induce a state to change its course of action. However, not only states engage in imposing such actions on the target states, International institutions such as the United Nations also engage in placing economic sanctions on target states to induce a positive change in their calculus. The 1990s are sometime referred to as the sanctions' decade due to United Nations imposition of economic sanctions on many countries. The institution believes that instead of military action or violent confrontations, economic sanctions present a far better option to engage the target state and to force them to change course. The actions of UN were then followed by individual states in further isolating the target states (Centre for Security Studies 2010).

Sanctions continue to play a central role in contemporary politics as well. The debate on the sanctions highlights the imperfect record it has had in changing state behaviours. But simultaneously it is argued that such actions are the best possible replacement for armed conflicts to achieve political ends (Jaeger 2015). With time the sanctions have become smarter which target specific financial transactions, business activities and individuals where the economy of the target state lies to better affect the economic situation of the state to elicit a favourable response. But it is also argued that even after economic sanctions, coercer might go to war which would result in first destroying the economy and then human life (Smeets 2018). There is an increasing trend in cooperation for sanctions application among states and regional and global institutions. This cooperation has increased primarily due to the similarities in the reasons for sanctions. Consider the example of Syrian civil war where the regime employed violent measures to tackle anti-government protestors. As a result of the violence five different international entities slammed sanctions on Syria including League of Arab States, European Union, United States, Organization of Islamic States and the Islamic Development Bank (Borzyskowski and Portela 2016).

3. Examples of coercive diplomacy methods and tactics and their outcomes

3.1 United Nations as a coercer

The UN charter lays the basis for imposition of economic sanctions. As mentioned above not only states but also international institutions impose sanctions. The UN charter under chapter 7, article 41 allows the UN to place sanctions on the states to force them to comply with the UN Resolutions and conventions. The provision falls short of calling for the use of armed force but calls for "complete or

partial interruption in economic relations; disconnection of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and severance of diplomatic relations” for ensuring enforcement measures to force target states to comply to international norms and law (Security Council Report 2013). The history of UN sanctions starts from 1963 when the institutions placed sanctions on the apartheid regime of South Africa and has since continued in the path till end of the apartheid regime. The Security Council of the UN is charged with placing the sanctions on the target state. There are five objectives for which such sanctions could be applied. They include: conflict resolution, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, democratization and protection of civilians in conflict (including human rights) (Ibid).

3.2 United States as a coercer

The United States foreign policy essentials include coercion and threat and use of force as core pillars. The US has unilaterally, multilaterally and through international institutions placed sanctions on states, which opposed its interests or acted against international norms and human rights. More recently, the US has engaged in coercive bargaining with Iran, North Korea and China, (Sechser 2018). In the last decade, however, the US engaged in coercive diplomacy and forced states to comply with its version of democracy. For instance, Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia, Libya and Iraq were all forced to comply with US dictation through coercive diplomacy tactics. In failing to do so the results were severe. President Clinton while engaging North Korea resorted to dialogue, while President George Bush happened to be a coercer and he named North Korea among his list of “axis of evil”. President Barak Obama has somewhat been benign to the issue (Lee 2018).

3.3 European Union as a coercer

By 1980, the European Union (EU) did not apply its own sanction programme. Prior to that, the EU member states did follow the sanctions imposed by the UN on multiple states but did not have their own such programme. However, at the outset of the Soviet-Afghan war, the European states planned joint sanctions independent of the UN (Russell 2018). Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the forum established in 1992 for foreign policy coordination for the European Union further paved the way for EU to apply and manage sanctions programme apart from the US and the UN. The EU’s CSDP was primarily drafted for joint military action by the EU but the forum has employed sanctions as the leading resource to alter target states’ behaviour. Since then, the sanctions have led the way for EU in addressing political and security threats in international relations (Portela 2016). However, the notion of sanctions as employed by the US or UN in Iraq are in stark difference of what EU does under its idea of “restrictive measures”.

4. An overview of coercive diplomacy against Pakistan

By coercive diplomacy we essentially mean to inflict economic, diplomatic or political harm to target states in order to force them to act in a specific manner. The target state is subject to such diplomacy to compel it to act in accordance with the interests of the executor. However, sometimes such measures can have unintended consequences as well (Nephew 2017). Pakistan has been at the receiving end of such diplomacy. Pakistan since its inception in 1947 has had many highs and lows when it comes to its bilateral relations with the US. In comparison to other nations, highs and lows between the two states are drastic and extreme (Collins 2008). Pakistan has had relations with the US since its creations and in the 1950s, it was the most “allied ally” of the US (Pandey 2018). The US and the larger western world could not fathom the growth and rise of communism in South Asia and the Middle East and hence

worked out a policy of engaging the regions with economic, military and political backing to contain communism (Ahmed 2016). However, such cordial relations have not been consistent and as interests diverges, the US involved coercive diplomacy to compel Pakistan to change its course of action (ibid).

The striking theme of US coercive diplomacy with Pakistan has been on the primes of nuclear weapons or a war with India. To counter these perceived threats, the US has time and again resorted to sanctioning Pakistan (Weinstein 2016). As a result of such economic sanctions Pakistan has had to reach out to the international institutions like the IMF for keeping the economy alive (Malik 2018). Such sanctions have also compelled Pakistan to look for other economic partners like Kingdom of Saudi Arabia who helped Pakistan financially in the past and continues to do so. Some have commented that this aid comes with the demand of propagating Saudi religious ideology in the region (Sial 2015). Apart from the US, India has also employed coercive diplomacy tactics against Pakistan especially after the 2001 Indian parliament attack in order to force Pakistan to act against what India perceives to be terrorist organizations designed to attack India (Hussain and Ejaz 2015)

4.1 United States' coercion towards Pakistan

Post 9/11 period, the US blaming Pakistan for providing safe havens to the Islamic militants. The United States policy for South Asia, is centered on authorizing more troops to Afghanistan and pressurizing Pakistan to “do more” to control Taliban’s (Islamic militants), or ready for the consequences. It has been a proven fact that the more you fulfil unjust demands of coercer state the more you will be coerced. The United States relation with Pakistan has many episodes of ups and downs; it has complex, troublesome and transactional nature. Pak-US relations are based on instrumental exchange rather than ideological affinity; such type of relations is termed as “clientelistic” (Jafferlot 2016). After 9/11 incident, the United States has applied coercive tactics to coerce Pakistan to join its “global war on terror”.

The strategic objective of the US and Pakistan differs from each other. Pakistan has benefitted from its relations with the United States to strengthen its economy and military capabilities to counter India (Yusuf 2017) whereas the United States interests are to strengthen Cold War alliance system, conducting a war on terrorism in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Kaura 2017). The United States has applied “carrot and stick” or engagement and containment approach for Pakistan. The US war against Taliban seems to be the only commonality or dimension of Pak-US relations while differences in achieving the strategic objectives have widened the “trust gap” between the two countries. Pakistan is seeking friendly relations with Afghanistan to eliminate Indian influence, while the US is trying to prevent Taliban to regain power in Afghanistan.

4.1.1. US sanctions against Pakistan

Since from the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the United States has bilateral relation with Pakistan, a country of great geostrategic importance that served as frontline state for the US during cold war. Initially, both the countries have ideological alignment. But, since 1965, the US has been time and again imposing sanctions against Pakistan, which fall in coercive diplomatic tactics (as given in the table below). The American approach to restrict material support to Pakistan at the time of its confrontation with India and lifting up of the sanctions to protect its immediate interest has resulted in mistrust among two ally states (Pandey 2018).

Table: Sanctions imposed by United States

Year	Type of sanction(s)	Coercive reasons
1965	Military	No military aid to Pakistan due to Pakistan's use of American military supplies against India in 1965 war.
1971	Military	No military aid due to excessive human rights violations in East Pakistan.
1977	Economic and Military	Military and economic aid terminated (without officially invoking the Symington Amendment), due to Pakistan's relentless pursuit of the French reprocessing plant deal.
1979	Economic and Military	Economic and military aid terminated, as Pakistan's attempts to develop a nuclear weapon programme continued at Kahuta facility near Islamabad. In addition to the Symington Amendment, the Glenn Amendment prohibited US aid to any country that acquires or transfers nuclear reprocessing technology, or explodes or transfers a nuclear device.
1990	Economic and Military	The 1985 Pressler Amendment authorized banning of most of the US military and economic assistance to Pakistan, provided the US President on an annual basis give a certificate to the Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. Further, the US President had to certify that any American aid to Pakistan would significantly reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing a nuclear device.
1998	Economic and Military	Glenn Amendment states that an extensive set of sanctions must be imposed if a non-nuclear weapon state detonates an explosive nuclear device. Symington Amendment prohibits US economic and military assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or technology without adhering to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
1999	Economic and Military	Section 508 of the US Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the US from providing most forms of economic and military assistance to countries whose duly elected head of government is deposed by a military coup or decree.
2017-18	Economic and Military	These sanctions prohibit most of the US military and economic aid to Pakistan, unless Secretary of State certifies the following to the Committees on Appropriations, among other assurances

		<p>Pakistan is cooperating with the US in counterterrorism efforts against the Haqqani Network, Quetta Shura Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other domestic and foreign terror outfits.</p> <p>Pakistan has not supported schools run by the Taliban, and that Pakistani intelligence services are not intervening extra-judicially in the governance of Pakistan.</p> <p>Pakistan is preventing the proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise.</p>
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(Source: US sanctions on Pakistan and their failure as strategic deterrent)

The US is not only imposing sanctions but also coercing Pakistan through international financial institutions. It has the opportunity to take such measures to pressurize Pakistan, as Pakistan is economically a vulnerable state and highly dependent upon external financial institutions. The US has this leverage as a result of its voting power in these international financial institutions. Recently, in reaction to CPEC investment, The US has warned International Monetary Fund (IMF) of providing new bailout package to Pakistan suspecting that it will be used to pay off CPEC related debts (Fair 2018). The trump administration's recent policy for South Asia and Afghanistan is an indication of a shift of relationship with Pakistan. The Americans strategy, which on the one hand acknowledges Pakistan's efforts against terrorism and on the other accuses it of protecting terrorists, is being considered as an attempt of coercion to change Pakistan's will to protect American's objectives in Afghanistan and take the ownership of the US failure there. To coerce Pakistan, the US has not only suspended all security related assistance to Pakistan, but also hinted to cancel Pakistan's status of non-NATO ally and held back its support at international financial institutions (Rayan, Gowen and Morello 2018).

History tells us that the United States has used financial aid as leverage at many times. In the 1990s such type of measures had been taken to stop Pakistan for pursuing its nuclear programme. It was the time when Soviet war in Afghanistan had ended, so the United States had almost zero dependency over Pakistan. The recent suspension of aid programme, at the time when US is highly dependent on Pakistan for its success in Afghanistan clearly indicates that Washington is not happy with Pakistan's "not to do more" stance. This suspension could be a Preamble of hard measures against Pakistan such as; labelling as terrorist state or increasing number of US military strikes (drone attacks) (Kugelman 2018). The US is also using its relations with allied countries and international forums to pressurize Pakistan. The decision to put Pakistan on grey list by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) could be the example of such coercion (Iqbal 2018). Pakistan's allies - Turkey, Saudi Arabia and China - were initially against the decision to put Pakistan on grey list, but later they had not been able to avert the decision due to pressure from the United States (ibid).

4.2 Indian coercive diplomacy towards Pakistan

India, with the help of the United States, is using coercive diplomatic tactics against Pakistan. Despite being an ally of the United States since long, Pakistan did not receive full and candid support from the US during 1948, 1965 and 1971 wars with India (Hussain and Ejaz 2015) whereas India has full support from the US during these conflicts. (ibid.). As mentioned above, active Indian coercive diplomacy against Pakistan has started right after the 2001 attack on Indian parliament. The 9/11 incident encouraged India to actively use coercive diplomacy against Pakistan as the US did. In response to parliament attack, India deployed massive army on Pakistan's border and tried to influence Pakistan by

other countries. On the pretext of blaming Pakistan for the incidence of attacks on the parliament, an army base, the Red Fort and in Mumbai, India launched a vilification fifth generation war against Pakistan projecting as if Pakistan is fanning terrorism against India. The objective behind was to get Pakistan declared a 'terrorist state'. India used different coercive tools to let Pakistan down in the comity of nations but Pakistan's effective counter based on facts exposed Indian designs.

On the Line of Control in Kashmir and on the borders with Pakistan, India installed Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS), that include: CCTV cameras, thermal and night vision devices, radars, underground sensors and laser barriers to prevent what they blame entry of terrorists from Pakistani side. In the presence of such a tight surveillance, how is it possible that militants from Pakistan infiltrate into India and carry out terrorist activities? If there is terrorism inside the Indian controlled areas and borders, then the Indians should put their house in order instead of blaming Pakistan for terrorist activities in India (Ali 2017). In the fifth-generation war and coercive diplomacy, India got the support of the US administration for exchange of Indian investment to protect the interests of the United States in Afghanistan and in South Asia to counter China. In its latest South Asia policy, the US administration has expressed its desire to enhance strategic partnership with India by increasing its role in the economic development of Afghanistan (White House 2017). From the very beginning, India has started blaming Pakistan for whatever goes wrong in India to avoid talks on Kashmir dispute. India continues with this policy of avoiding talks on real issues even today (Noorani 2018).

India alleging Pakistan for terrorist activities, makes statement to the effect that no dialogue is possible with Pakistan as long as terrorism continues in Indian held Kashmir. In response to the allegations, Pakistan always emphasizes on human rights violations in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir by Indian army (Swami 2006). Both the countries are not only competing at diplomatic fronts, they have also fought three full-fledged wars over the Kashmir dispute (Banerjee 2016). India is not only blaming Pakistan for terrorist activities in Kashmir, they blamed for other things as well, for example Khalsa Tehreek. Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had said: "They failed miserably in their evil designs in Punjab. Terrorism bled Punjab; but, in the end, it fled Punjab. It could not dent Hindu-Sikh unity. Similarly, the terrorists and their mentors are doomed to fail in Jammu and Kashmir, too". He forgot that most of the Sikh holy places in Amritsar had been attacked by the Hindus (Lodhi 2002). India is continuously escaping to sit on dialogue table to settle down the disputes (including Kashmir issue), rather it has been relying on military and political (internal and external) pressure to turning Pakistan to do her bidding (ibid.).

5. Challenges and opportunities to counter coercive diplomatic tactics

5.1 CPEC and strategic relations with China

In response to US economic and military sanctions, Pakistan has started looking for other international avenues; its relation with China is one of the examples. Currently, the US is coercing Pakistan to "do more" by halting military aid, while China has promised support and cooperation to Pakistan by appreciating its effort for counterterrorism (LaFranchi 2018). China is increasing its economic footprint in Pakistan as the US is providing opportunities by limiting its economic favour. Pakistan has borrowed \$ 5 billion from Chinese financial institution during fiscal year 2017-18 (Jorgic 2018). Similarly, China has more Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan in the form of CPEC than that of US investment here and also has more bilateral trade agreements (Marlow and Dilawar 2017). China has planned to invest

\$ 60 billion over 15 years under CPEC agreement, which is expected to have positive impact on Pakistan's economy (BMI Research 2018).

Pakistan's relationship with China is not new; historically Pakistan has managed to tie its relationship with both China and the US. The US South Asia policy, having intention to build strong relations with India and imposing penalties on Pakistan, may further push Pakistan to strengthen its strategic relations with China. In current scenario, China has higher stakes in stability of Pakistan's economy, as it is the centre of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The United States has been critical of "strategic" component of CPEC, which is in fact is a strategic coercion by the US towards Pakistan (Tariq 2018). In Pakistan, CPEC is seen an alternative to United States military and financial aid (ibid.). Currently, China is heavily investing and providing loans to Pakistan, and playing its role in strengthening Pak-Afghan relations. Despite having support from China, one cannot ignore the importance of Pakistan's relations with the United States as China would not totally bear the burden of stabilizing Pakistan to its own shoulders. It would not totally take up the US responsibilities in Pakistan, but it could take up the opportunity to occupy a policy space here. There are some concerns over the United States-India policies about CPEC; whenever there is a dispute, US policies go in favour of India. In the light of increasing common geostrategic interests in the region, the US and India are trying to establish strong ties with each other to somehow coerce Pakistan by using grey hybrid warfare techniques and other actions. The increasing strategic partnership among US and India, and cracks in US-Pak relationship could provide India an opportunity to pursue its own regional objectives. This situation could lead to enhance tension among India and Pakistan, as India becomes increasingly concerned about its apprehension (Kugelman 2017). Current tension between India and Pakistan is a testimony to the Indian mindset against Pakistan. Indian media has crossed all limits in its grey propaganda against Pakistan but it stands exposed before its people as everyday a new criticism of the Modi government and media appears on social media by the Indians themselves.

Apparently to protect its heavy investment in Pakistan, China is more concerned about political and security stability in the country. It also has stakes in peace and stability in Afghanistan, in wake of its apprehension to spread of insurgency in its Xinjiang Region (Curtis 2016). Both the US and China have the opportunity to work together to promote peace in the region so that the future of CPEC could be secured. CPEC could be an opportunity to solve many of the regional problems, for example; if India joins CPEC, it could help ease tension in the region.

5.2 Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has placed Pakistan's name on "jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies" known as grey list of FATF. Pakistan's name on FATF list is not new, it was there in 2008, 2012 to 2015 (Karim and Hayat 2018). Recently, FATF has placed Pakistan's name on grey list, because of its structural deficiencies on the count of weak non-compliance on money laundering and terrorism related financing. The placement of Pakistan's name on grey list is far more political than financial in nature. It has been viewed as an attempt of coercion by the United States and now India being a key influencer at the FATF Asia and the Pacific to exert pressure on Pakistan to "do more" on terrorism related matters to protect its objectives. The US can make it difficult for Pakistan to remove its name from the list, because the former is a major financer of FATF and has more influence than other countries (ibid.). Before placing Pakistan's name on FATF watch list, the US had cut down its military assistance. When it appears that cutting of financial aid failed to achieve the desired objectives, it had decided to place Pakistan's name on FATF list.

The US has built up pressure on Pakistan to act against the culprits responsible for terrorism not only in Afghanistan but also in India (Ali 2018). Being placed on FATF watch list may have more economic impacts than legal implications. For example; international financial and regulatory institutions may adopt some hard rules and checklists to avoid wary of transactions with Pakistan (Jorgic, Price & Chatterjee 2018). As Pakistan is highly dependent on international financial institutions to fulfil its economic and financial needs, it is feared that it would become more and more vulnerable to such coercive tactics by international institutions and superpowers.

5.3 International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Willingly or unwillingly, Pakistan has to go to IMF to keep its economy on track if the economy faces trouble amid sanctions or crisis of balance of payment. Unfortunately, the decision-making power of these financial institutions are also in the hands of world super powers. In last 60 years, Pakistan borrowed money from IMF for 21 times under various facilities/programs (graph below). To receive recent bailout package from IMF, requires a diplomatic support from the US, European countries, China and Russia.

LOANS TAKEN BY PAKISTAN FROM THE IMF

Since 1958, we have taken a total of 21 loans from the IMF, 12 of which can be called bailouts. In the past 60 years we have borrowed more than \$27 billion as per the current value of the SDR. The values represented in this graph are in SDR, which is the IMF's currency.



Historically the SDR has gravitated between 0.6 and 0.7 USD, currently 1 SDR = 0.71 USD

Source: International Monetary Fund

Trump administration is believed to have asked IMF to place strict terms and conditions on Pakistan for its \$ 6 to 7 billion bailout package to protect its strategic objectives under new South Asian Policy. Lately, as Pakistan has played a key role in bringing Taliban on the negotiating table, the situation has been changed a bit. The US policy to use financial institutions as tool for strategic and diplomatic coercion is not new method. However, whenever the United States needed Pakistan, it had offered direct and indirect support to secure its own strategic objective. For example; in the post 9/11 scenario, the United States required Pakistan's assistant to launch military operation in Afghanistan, the United States had not only provided 1 billion USD, it had also facilitated Pakistan to settle financial matters with the World Bank and IMF (Ahmed 2001).

The countries under economic sanctions often face difficulties to get access to funds from international financial institutions. The United States has more influence on IMF; the country which is under sanction by the US is less likely to receive funds from IMF (Peksen and Woo 2018). As Pakistan is facing the challenge of balance of payment, it is highly dependent on U.S for securing a so-called bailout package from IMF. In future, the United States could use its position in IMF to pressurize Pakistan to fulfil its desired objective as it did in the past.

5.4 Afghan peace process

After having 17 years of war in Afghanistan, the US has now realized that negotiation with Taliban is the right solution. The Afghan government also supported US to talk directly with Taliban. Other stakeholders also supported the peace talks. Though both Taliban and the US realized the importance of peace talks, it was Pakistan that played a vital role in bringing Taliban to the negotiating table. (Kugelman 2019). Although, the United States has been trying to isolate Pakistan, Trump administration felt the need to get Pakistan's support in bringing Taliban to the fold.

If United States withdraw its troops unilaterally, may leads to civil war in Afghanistan and security of the whole region would be at stake. Pakistan form day one was clear that dialogue among all stakeholders is the only right solution for peace in Afghanistan (Zafar 2019). In view of the changes in geostrategic and geopolitical situation of the region, it would be the responsibility of the regional countries to play a proactive role to secure their interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan and China the opportunity to extend its CPEC project to Afghanistan to hamper the peace process. **The United States has also been supportive of "Afghanistan Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity", for Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process** (Khan 2018). Afghanistan in most of the time has been a reason for the ups and downs in U.S-Pak relations and to settle issue in Afghanistan, the United States used coercive tactics to push Pakistan to provide support to US in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Imran Khan's desire to improve relations with the neighbours can be seen as an advantage to foster the peace process and for the development of trust in the Pak-Afghan and the US-Pak relations.

6. Conclusion

This paper analyzes as to how Pakistan has been subjected to coercive diplomacy. Since the coercion continues on the diplomatic front and on media, there is a need to mobilize people of Pakistan on the dynamics of coercive diplomacy and grey hybrid war being unleashed against the country so that they can understand the war doctrine, methodologies and tactics of the enemies. We have to rethink whether or not our foreign, economic and domestic policies are aligned to realize the gravity of the situation. We have to open up debates on the subject at grass roots level, especially targeting the youth through social media. We as a nation need to look at the options to counter war doctrines perpetuated against Pakistan. We also need to weigh our economy and the foreign policy, to plug the loopholes in the system and to strengthen participatory democracy and people's centric governance so that we might win over our people by building their confidence in state and the system by providing them a decent living and justice and inculcate them the feeling of being equal citizens living in a peaceful and tolerant society. The people of Pakistan together with its military and political leadership can defeat all nefarious war doctrines against Pakistan.

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