

11

Security

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Introduction	161
Four crises	161
Defining security	163
Key theories and concepts	163
Conclusion	170
Questions	170
Further reading	170

Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept and practice of security in international relations. It explores the dilemmas faced by states, individuals and the global community by, first, looking at contemporary crises and disagreements about security; second, examining how security has been differently defined and focused; and third, surveying how different theoretical approaches have understood and analysed security.

Four crises

In October 1962 a US U-2 reconnaissance aircraft returned from a routine overflight of Cuba with photographs of Soviet personnel and machinery installing nuclear missiles aimed at the US – precipitating a crisis that almost led to global nuclear war (Blight and Lang 2005). In July 1997 the government of Thailand floated its currency, the baht, on international markets after losing US\$23 billion trying to defend its value from attack by traders. It lost 15 per cent of its value in one day, provoking a contagion effect across East Asia that resulted in widespread corporate bankruptcies, massive falls in economic growth and employment, the fall of governments, and protests, riots and civil violence that took thousands of lives (Robison, Beeson et al. 2000).

Two years later, in September 1999, the people of East Timor voted in a referendum on independence from Indonesia, only to fall victim to a campaign of murder and destruction by Indonesian-backed militias. After many days of carnage and intense international diplomacy, the **United Nations** Security Council authorised a military intervention led by Australia to stop the violence (H. McDonald et al. 2002). And on 11 September 2001, a group of twelve men boarded four aircraft in Boston, Newark and Washington. A few minutes after takeoff they hijacked the planes and directed them towards New York and Washington. Two of the aircraft were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, the other into the Pentagon, and the last crashed into a Pennsylvania field. The towers caught fire and later collapsed. The attacks killed nearly 3000 people and wounded thousands more, and provoked a response that changed the strategic landscape of the world forever (National Commission 2004).

These are just four examples of many global events and problems that are understood and addressed under the name of **security**. Yet they constitute very different kinds of crisis and all – apart from the first – constitute a challenge to traditional ways of thinking about security. They thus illustrate two important facts about security issues and security studies. First, they refer to complex and profoundly important problems of survival, prosperity and social cohesion. And second, there is no agreement among scholars and policymakers about how to make security policy, the problems upon which it should be focused, or how security should be conceptualised and studied. Security is, as it is now commonplace to say, a ‘contested concept’, *and* a contested practice (Dalby 1997).

Consider the examples above. According to the dominant security paradigm in Southeast Asia, ‘comprehensive security’, the East Timorese independence movement was considered a threat to Indonesia’s ‘national unity’ and ‘territorial integrity’, and Indonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbours recognised its claim to the territory and largely turned a blind eye to its brutal repression of the population. Here the focus of security is the territorial state, and coercive and violent means are seen as acceptable ways of ensuring it. However, under a very different security paradigm, that of ‘human security’,

it is the security of the East Timorese people that is most important and the state of Indonesia is seen as the primary threat – this doctrine would have generated efforts to promote **human rights**, demilitarise the territory, and use dialogue to achieve a lasting solution to East Timor's political status. A 'human security' approach also underpinned the obligations felt by members of the UN Security Council to intervene to stop the violence, and hence the 1999 crisis symbolised a profound clash of two paradigms, each of which laid claim to an authoritative understanding of security.

The East Asian crisis of 1997–8 simply did not register on the radar of regional security officials until after it occurred, wherein it was thought of (conventionally) in terms of the 'economic security' and 'regional resilience' of Asia, or, more radically, in terms of the way in which complex political and economic processes combined to gravely affect the human security of millions (A. Burke 2008; Acharya 2001; Collins 2003). The **Cuban missile crisis** represented a classical security problem – what the realist scholar Stephen Walt (1991) insists is the proper focus of security studies, that of the threat and use of military force – except that again it exemplified the impact of clashing paradigms. By 1962 the US and USSR were in a very unstable relationship of mutual nuclear '**deterrence**', which in classical strategic theory is meant to ensure that the weapons will not be used in anger. However the crisis highlighted the failure of this fragile 'balance of terror' to safeguard humanity should deterrence fail. Powerful forces in the US government prepared *and urged* a military invasion of Cuba to remove Castro's regime and deal with the weapons, while Kennedy and his advisors like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara understood that such action could quickly escalate into a global holocaust. They successfully negotiated a deal that exchanged a Soviet withdrawal of the missiles for a later withdrawal of US weapons from Turkey and a guarantee not to invade Cuba, and the experience led to McNamara later becoming a vocal advocate of nuclear disarmament (Blight and Lang 2005: 60–85). Yet nuclear 'deterrence' remains a cornerstone of the security policies of many states,' including the US.

The 11 September attacks, like few events in US history, undermined many assumptions about the utility of military power to ensure national security. The lesson the Bush administration took from the events was that deterrence no longer held against **terrorists** and **rogue states**, and that threats must be met – with military force – before they could emerge. This doctrine was so revolutionary as to put the important security 'regimes' and '**norms**' that the global community has been developing since 1945 under great pressure.

In the wake of September 11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the UN commissioned a major report by a group of statespersons – the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change – on the international security agenda. It called for a 'new security consensus' based around 'six clusters of threats', including economic instability and poverty, state conflict, internal conflict and large-scale human rights abuse, transnational organised crime, weapons of mass destruction and environmental crisis. It emphasised, in a way reflected in the UK National Security Strategy (UK Cabinet Office 2008), that 'today's threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels'. Most significantly, it also noted a disturbing lack of consensus globally about what threats mattered, and to whom:

Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being ... Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful ... What is needed today is nothing less than

a new consensus between alliances that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is simple: we all share responsibility for each other's security (High Level Panel 2004: 10).

Defining security

Given such disagreement, defining security becomes a highly political matter. Different paradigms define security differently and their definitions incorporate biases about who is to be secured and how. The classical (**realist**) definition, advanced by writers such as Walter Lippman and Arnold Wolfers, argues that a nation's security is determined by its ability to defend itself against threats to 'core' or 'acquired values', in war if necessary (Baylis 2001: 255). Hans Morgenthau defined **national security** as 'the integrity of the national territory and its institutions' and said that it was 'the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend without compromise'. He did gesture towards an understanding of 'international' security dynamics, one taken up by **liberals**, when he argued that statesmen must try to see problems from the point of view of other nations and diplomacy must seek to make all nations equally secure (Morgenthau 1973: 553–5). This contrasts with the views of some realists that security is a zero-sum game, that a nation is secure to the extent that others are not. Barry Buzan and his colleagues in the 'Copenhagen School' offer a revealing 'extended realist' definition when they say that

security is about survival ... when an issue is posed as constituting an existential threat to a designated referent object [the state] ... The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them (Buzan et al. 1998: 21).

Critical writers, on the other hand, define security very differently. They argue that security should be holistic and not focused primarily on the state or military conflict. Ken Booth, of the 'Welsh School' of critical security studies, argues that security should be about the 'emancipation ... of individuals and groups from those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do' (Booth 1991: 319). The feminist scholar J. Ann Tickner defines security as 'the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations' (Tickner 1992: 127–44). This shifts the referent to individuals and communities and is biased towards a politics of social transformation. Other critical scholars argue that if we want to understand the (often negative) impacts of security discourse and policy it is helpful to shift from analysing what security 'is' to what it 'does', to see it as a set of practices and techniques. Such scholars argue that just the use of the term 'security' grants governments enormous power. Security is less an end state than a process: it is a form of *power*, a 'political technology' that operates on individuals and populations at the same time. It thus must be 'deconstructed' and placed under suspicion (A. Burke 2001 and 2006; McDonald 2005). Rethinking security in more human-centred ways can follow such critique.

Key theories and concepts

There are a bewildering diversity of approaches to security policy and analysis. However, they can be usefully boiled down to the following broad categories:

- realist (incorporating 'classical' realist, **neorealist** and 'extended' realist approaches)

- liberal (incorporating 'collective', 'common', 'cooperative' and 'human' security approaches)
- **constructivist** (incorporating elements of realist and liberal approaches)
- critical and feminist approaches.

Realist approaches

As we saw with Hans Morgenthau's definition above, the realist paradigm focuses upon national security. Realist approaches privilege the state as the object of security and see threats primarily emerging from the military and economic competition between states. Because they discount the possibility of international cooperation or the development of peaceful norms of behaviour, they emphasise what they call the 'self-help' capacities of states in developing strong military forces and strategic **alliances** with other states. They are sceptical of the value of **international law** or 'collective security', although they do occasionally endorse the creation of coalitions of powers (such in the Gulf War of 1990–91) to punish or discipline a state that has acted in ways detrimental to their **national interests** or security. They regard **war** as a perennial tendency in human nature and argue that it cannot be abolished or controlled through law or moral suasion. Instead, they believe that the *fear* of unacceptable punishment (the core idea of 'deterrence'), or *prudence* in the face of unacceptable costs or a chaotic result, will restrain statesmen from acting aggressively.

Realists thus think of the threat and use of armed force, after the theorist of war Carl von Clausewitz (1989), as dictated by national interests and cost-benefit analysis. They utilise an instrumental, *strategic* perspective that seeks to link violent means with political ends. However, in this arena interesting debates among realists have arisen. On the use of force, realists have divided into two groups. A more hawkish group, associated with strategic studies and exemplified by thinkers such as Edward Luttwak (1987) and Colin Gray (1998, 1999), endorses violence as a tool of statecraft and is more concerned with technical issues of weapons systems, military preparedness, and military tactics and strategy. A second group argues that the use of force should always be a last resort and often has chaotic and costly effects that can't be anticipated (see A. Burke 2006; S. Brown 2003; Lebow 2003). The actions of Robert McNamara and his colleagues during the Cuban missile crisis sit within this camp, and the opposition of Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer to the invasion of Iraq is another example (Blight and Lang 2005; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003).

Deterrence, which is defined as 'manipulating another's behaviour through threats', has also generated complex debates (Freedman 2004: 6; Jervis 1979). It developed after 1945 when US planners sought to grapple with the changes wrought by nuclear weapons. The strategist Bernard Brodie is famous for arguing that 'thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them' (Brodie 1946: 67). Nuclear and conventional strategy henceforth was framed around the problem of developing doctrines and weapons systems that would deter Soviet or other enemy attack. Such approaches still underpin military strategies around the world, especially in Northeast Asia where the US confronts China and North Korea with nuclear and conventional weapons. Yet realists also identified serious problems with the practice. John Herz (1950) described what he called the '**security dilemma**', which occurred as defensive measures by one state were perceived as aggressive or threatening by another, who in turn took new

measures to secure themselves, leading to a spiral of arms acquisition and mistrust (Booth and Wheeler 2008). This could lead to crises such as those over Berlin (1961) or Cuba (1962), leading some analysts to point out that once deterrence failed, the doctrine lost all value.

What Alan Dupont calls 'extended' security approaches do not depart from traditional realist understandings of military security dilemmas but, especially since the end of the **Cold War**, have pointed to a wider range of security threats and challenges for states, such as terrorism, unregulated people movements, transnational crime, disease, or environmental degradation (Dupont 2001). These threats do not emerge from states or by armed violence, but, it is argued, can still affect the basic values and well-being of national communities. Some scholars and not a few policymakers have also characterised such threats (especially from migration) as threats to the *identity* of receiving states, directly making **identity** a security issue – something critical scholars strongly question (Chalk 2000; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998).

Liberal approaches

Liberals argue that it is inadequate for security to be based on the power balancing and deterrence calculations of individual states, believing that the carnage of the two world wars and the dangers of nuclear holocaust require the development of international rules and cooperative institutions to govern state behaviour and punish wrongdoers. This attitude has influenced the development of an important body of international law and a number of global and regional institutions relating to security. The most important of these are the UN and its Charter, which outlaws armed aggression and will only authorise the use of force in defence against attack with the concurrence of the fifteen-member Security Council (see Box 11.1). Key treaties, which have the moral force of international law, include those on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty, and the Ottawa Convention banning land mines. Not only does the UN seek to control when states go to war (*jus ad bellum*), it also seeks to control how states may conduct wars (*jus in bello*) through the



AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed
force shall not be used, save in the common interest.

The NPT is a particularly important treaty, because it has seen 182 countries agree both *not to develop* nuclear weapons and (in the case of six existing 'nuclear weapons states') to *disarm* themselves of their arsenals. The treaty also has provisions for long-term efforts at *general disarmament*, because states recognise that the processes of conventional and nuclear weapons proliferation are linked. Hence **disarmament** is an important element of liberal thinking about security, even if they acknowledge that it is difficult to achieve in a world where many states find themselves in dangerous security dilemmas, and that disarmament requires cooperation and agreement to be effective. Liberals emphasise the importance of disarmament because they believe deterrence to be dangerously flawed and unstable; hence disarmament is the only effective way to prevent escalation to major war or disasters during a crisis (see McNamara and Blight 2003; Schell 2001; ICNND 2009) (see Box 11.2).

BOX 11.2: DISCUSSION POINTS**Global security and nuclear fears**

The years since September 11 have stimulated profound new fears about the dangers of nuclear weapons, and renewed efforts to begin a global process of strengthening nuclear security and achieving disarmament (A. Burke 2009). Consistent with its hawkish approach to the use of force, the Bush administration adopted a nuclear doctrine in 2001 that rejected its disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT, and adopted new uses for nuclear weapons including in conventional war or against WMD (weapons of mass destruction) facilities in enemy states, which had very destabilising effects (McDonough 2006). However, by 2007 a group of former US secretaries of defense and state (including a former advocate of limited nuclear war and negotiator of arms control agreements with the USSR, Henry Kissinger) were arguing for the US to support total nuclear disarmament as a key to US and international security (Shultz et al. 2007). They were especially concerned that non-state actors may gain access to nuclear weapons or radiological materials, as al-Qaeda leaders had stated they would use WMDs if they could obtain them. The proliferation of weapons technology to North Korea and Iran further raised fears of a nuclear 'tipping point' where the NPT would collapse in a cascade of proliferation. Stalemate at the 2005 review conference on the NPT – which could not agree on a final communiqué – worsened such fears.

In 2009 new US president Barack Obama announced he would pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, although he cautioned that the goal would not be reached in his lifetime. He committed his administration to negotiating a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, and to **ratify** new conventions banning nuclear tests and fissile material production. His administration also hosted a nuclear security summit, published a new nuclear posture review, and supported a successful 2010 NPT review conference. At this point the world faced three dilemmas: managing or reversing proliferation in North Korea, Iran and between Pakistan and India so as to hold the system together; beginning cooperative reductions to trigger disarmament momentum; and, over the long term, managing the security complexities of a

world with few or no nuclear weapons. These problems were the subject of academic research (Ruzicka & Wheeler 2010; A. Burke 2009; Hanson 2010) and of a major report published by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND 2009).

Regional cooperative security institutions include the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was established in 1973 to moderate Cold War tensions (and now includes initiatives on human rights and the environment), and the **ASEAN** Regional Forum (ARF), which is an Asia-Pacific grouping of states that seeks to promote greater transparency and dialogue on regional security problems. Southeast Asia is an interesting case where liberal norms of conduct that preclude the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the use of force to settle disputes *between* regional states coexist with extended realist norms *within* regional countries about the need to respond violently to internal threats to national unity and stability. This tangle of ideas is expressed in the Southeast Asian notion of comprehensive security – which expands security beyond the military dimension to incorporate political, economic and societal dimensions, but is still focused upon the ‘stability’ and ‘integrity’ of regional states (see Alagappa 1998: 624–5; Acharya 2001; Burke and McDonald 2007).

Liberals thus define their thinking and policy around three key concepts:

Collective security generally refers to efforts to build rules and laws at the international level, to create regional or global decision-making bodies and institutions, and to act in concert to enforce those rules. This is the paradigm at work when the UN Security Council deliberates or authorises military interventions, for example. In theory its decisions are meant to express a collective – even universal – consensus, but they can sometimes express the influence of more powerful states.

Common security was a concept developed by the 1982 Palme Commission to replace the doctrine of mutual deterrence. Its chairman, former Swedish prime minister Olaf Palme, argued that in the nuclear era we must ‘achieve security not against the adversary but together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction’ (Palme Commission 1982).

Cooperative security is an idea promoted by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans in the context of the formation of the ARF, one that he claimed could fold collective, common and comprehensive security into a conceptual whole (Evans and Grant 1995: 75–7). This idea he also used to promote more attention to the potential role of the UN in preventing genocide or crimes against humanity through diplomatic and military intervention; his and other efforts culminated in a report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General entitled *The responsibility to protect* (ICISS 2001).

However, a fourth concept – human security – challenges Evans’s confidence in the coherence of the cooperative security concept, especially as it incorporates the idea of comprehensive security. Human security, which straddles the liberal and critical approaches, shifts the referent of security from the state to the individual human being, and incorporates a range of possible threats or processes that could negatively affect their basic welfare. While there has been much debate about the legitimate scope of human security, the most authoritative definition came from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which described it as ‘safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, as well as safety from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life’ (Roesad 2000).

Human security allows us to conceive of states as threats to their citizens, and to see insecurity arising from complex social, political and economic processes (including

those arising from widely accepted paradigms of development or political authority) rather than just military aggression or violence. However, human security is not without its critics – in Southeast Asia it challenges existing structures of power and many realist scholars believe that it complicates efforts to tightly define and focus upon security priorities (A. Burke 2001; Thomas and Tow 2002; Bellamy and McDonald 2002).

Constructivist approaches

Constructivist approaches to security develop and refine both liberal and realist analyses, although they tend to support liberal approaches in **normative** terms. They seek to understand the way *ideas* and *norms* affect international security and combine with national interests or military competition. As Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil (2004: 9) argue, 'constructivism is based on the fundamental view that ideational structures mediate how actors perceive, construct, and reproduce the institutional and material structures they inhabit as well as their own roles and identities within them'. Constructivists especially emphasise the way in which norms (broad inter-subjective agreements about what kind of policy or behaviour is legitimate, appropriate or effective) have the effect of controlling international politics (Reus-Smit 2004a: 40–68). Particular actions are then shaped or limited either *voluntarily* because an actor has internationalised a norm into their own identity or basic convictions, or because an actor feels *pressure* from other parts of their own or the international community.

A significant contribution of constructivist writers to security analysis is their development of Karl Deutsch's concept of the **security community**. As Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett state, this is to assert that 'community exists at the international level, that security politics is profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition [and] settle their differences short of war'. Security communities emerge where there is 'a development of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows [such as trade]' (Adler and Barnett 1998: 3–4). Amitav Acharya (2001) and Alex Bellamy (2004) have both argued that features of security community exist in East Asia (especially among the ASEAN countries) who have agreed norms that prevent them settling inter-state disputes by force, that limit the role of great powers and prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. While some critical writers acknowledge the value of this, they have also questioned how ASEAN combines liberal values at the inter-state level with very coercive and authoritarian norms *inside* their countries (Burke and McDonald 2007). Others have questioned the way security communities can shift the antagonism to those *outside* the security community, potentially creating 'regional fortresses preparing for the kind of civilisational conflict envisaged by Samuel Huntington' (Bellamy 2004: 10–11).

Critical and feminist approaches

Critical and feminist approaches to security are diverse, but they have in common a continuation of the basic normative orientation to human security. This is admirably expressed by the 'critical security studies' thinker Ken Booth as a commitment to security as **emancipation**, in the form of 'a more just society' that 'progressively limits the repressive structure of powers and processes, steadily squeezing the space for violent behaviour in all its direct and indirect manifestations', and by J. Ann Tickner's vision of a security based upon 'the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations' and for a reformulation of international relations in terms of the

'multiple insecurities' represented by ecological destruction, poverty and (gendered) structural violence. Booth argues that security needs to be 'holistic and non-statist', because 'the smaller units of universal human society ... will not be secure until the whole is secured' (Booth 1991, 2005: 263; Tickner 1992: 127–44).

These are what Matt McDonald has called 'reconstructive' critical perspectives, 'aimed at advancing alternative claims about what security is or should mean'. Another set of critical approaches (although they often converge) is termed 'deconstructive': they aim to put the meaning and operation of security as a *concept* and *politics* into question (Burke and McDonald 2007). These approaches do not reject the desire to rethink security in better ways, but they also show how it has worked historically as a system of power and how this creates a barrier to defining it in ways that support human dignity. They are especially interested in how images of security and threat work to divide the world between 'us' and 'them', to construct identity in opposition to some 'Other' – a nation, group, religion or way of living – which must be contained, destroyed or expelled (Burke 2007a).

Critical scholars are also interested in how antagonistic constructions of identity are a factor in conflict. They point to the conflicts between North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Papua, and Israel and Palestine, as particularly dangerous examples. Their argument is that even as there are significant military security dilemmas and other material interests at work, the roots of the conflicts lie in the ways identities have been constructed so as to deny the deep historical interconnections between societies, suppress or exaggerate claims to autonomy and difference, or deny the legitimacy and humanity of the other side. (Bleiker 2001; 2005; Burke 2001; 2007b) Hence critical and feminist writers seek to positively support *difference*, so as to show how inequality and violence are differentially distributed (the effects of the global economy or militarised violence affect men and women differently, for example) (Sylvester 2002; Lee-Koo 2002; J. J. Pettman 1996). (See Box 11.3.)

BOX 11.3: KEY TEXTS

'Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals'

Feminist scholars rethink security in two ways: by alerting us to the distinctive effects of economic processes, war and conflict on women's lives, and by analysing how constructions of gender are central to dominant ways of thinking about security and defence (Tickner 1992: 6). An example was set out in a famous essay by Carol Cohn, who wrote about her experiences studying at a centre for strategic studies. Her essay analysed the very abstract and gendered language through which strategists made nuclear deterrence and war thinkable, acceptable and rational. The very destructive effects of nuclear weapons were sanitised by terms such as 'clean bombs' and 'counter-value attacks', and associated with masculine images of force, power and sexual domination through terms such as 'penetration aids' and arguments that US dependence on nuclear weapons for security was 'irresistible, because you get more bang for the buck', or that 'to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff'. Debates over the virtues of 'protracted' versus 'spasm' attacks were resolved by describing the latter as 'releasing 70 to 80 per cent of your megatonnage in one orgasmic whump'. Cohn suggests that this was both 'a deadly serious display of the connections between masculine sexuality and the arms race' and 'a way of minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavours, of denying their deadly consequences' (Cohn 1987: 693, 696).

A further contribution of critical writers is to show the role of *representation* in threat analysis and security policy, and to highlight the increasingly politicised nature of security discourse. They argue that security threats are not objective (and that some threats are not threats at all), but are the product of representation through language and metaphor. They argue that the politics of fear (or security politics) is an increasingly common feature of modern democracies and that it is used to demonise particular groups, to gather votes, and to exert power over minorities or the left (McDonald 2005). Some critical writers, indeed, argue that such a politics is central to the way in which sovereign states and political communities have been conceived within modernity, and that it involves forms of 'biopolitical' power that takes hold of ordinary citizens' bodies and serves as a way of entrenching forms of economic **hegemony** and injustice, and violent ways of being (Burke 2007a; Agamben 1998; Dauphinée and Masters 2007). In such a circumstance, emancipation is a difficult task indeed, even if it is important to struggle for.

Conclusion

Security is currently the major preoccupation of modern world politics. It both expresses important concerns about human survival, values and community, and is liable to abuse by the unscrupulous in their struggle for political power and privilege. It forms a complex, interconnected set of global problems – encompassing war and civil conflict, nuclear weapons, faith, terrorism, environmental change and inequality – where the interests and dignity of individuals vie with the machinations of violent and powerful actors. We may have high hopes for a new spirit of consensus and cooperation to solve global security problems, but achieving it will be a major task in itself.

QUESTIONS

1. Why is the concept of security 'contested'?
2. Why is there global disagreement about what security problems matter? What should be done about it?
3. Does the use or threat of force lead to security?
4. What are the benefits and flaws of constructivist theories of security?
5. What is 'critical' about critical security approaches? Are they practical?
6. How might we begin to realise security for all human beings?

FURTHER READING

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- Booth, K. and Wheeler, N. J. 2008, *The security dilemma: fear, cooperation and trust in world politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave. A major refinement of realist theories of deterrence and inter-state security, utilising liberal and critical perspectives.